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CLIMATE CHANGE, FERC, AND
NATURAL GAS PIPELINES: THE LEGAL
BASIS FOR CONSIDERING GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS UNDER SECTION 7 OF
THE NATURAL GAS ACT
BY ROMANY M. WEBB*
ABSTRACT
As the federal agency charged with overseeing the interstate
transportation of natural gas, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) has recently faced growing criticism over its
approval of new pipelines. Critics have lambasted FERC for failing
to adequately consider the climate change impacts of pipeline
development, particularly the greenhouse gas emissions associated
with “upstream” natural gas production and “downstream” use. The
D.C. Circuit recently weighed in, holding that the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires consideration of
downstream greenhouse gas emissions, at least in some
circumstances. The precise scope of that requirement continues to
be debated before FERC, in the courts, and among scholars. While
recognizing the importance of that debate, this Article approaches
the issue from a different perspective, contending that the Natural
Gas Act (NGA) establishes an independent requirement for FERC
to consider climate change impacts, including upstream or
downstream greenhouse gas emissions. To support that contention,
the Article offers an in-depth look at the history of Section 7 of the
NGA, and its interpretation by the courts. It also provides a
comprehensive analysis of how environmental factors are dealt with
*
Romany M. Webb is an Associate Research Scholar at Columbia Law
School and Senior Fellow at the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law. The author
would like to thank Michael Burger, Executive Director of the Sabin Center for
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Center for Climate Change Law, and Jennifer Danis, Staff Attorney at the
Columbia Environmental Law Clinic, for their insightful comments on early drafts
of this paper. Any errors are my own.
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by FERC, showing that the Commission historically viewed
downstream environmental impacts as a key factor to be considered
under section 7 of the NGA, but now largely ignores them. That is
not only poor policy, but also violates section 7. FERC must,
therefore, change its current approach to evaluating pipeline
projects. That change could have significant implications for the
approval of future projects since, after accounting for environmental
impacts, FERC may be unable to conclude that a project is required
by the public convenience and necessity.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. natural gas industry has undergone profound changes
over the last two decades, with technological advances—most
notably the combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic
fracturing—enabling the development of vast gas reserves,
previously trapped in shale rock formations. Historically considered
uneconomic to develop, in 2000 shale gas accounted for less than
two percent of U.S. natural gas production.1 By 2017, the figure was
over fifty-seven percent,2 and forecast to continue rising.3 This socalled “shale revolution” has boosted total natural gas production,
which grew by approximately thirty-eight percent from 2000 to

1
See Zhongmin Wang & Alan Krupnick, A Retrospective Review of Shale
Gas Development in the United States: What Led to the Boom? 1 (Res. for the
Future, Working Paper No. 13-12, 2013), https://perma.cc/87B3-GD8D.
2
See Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production, ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_dc_NUS_mmcf_a.htm (last
updated Jan. 31, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3NKD-XCL2].
3
See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019 WITH
PROJECTIONS TO 2050, at 76 (2019), https://perma.cc/HVN4-2RMA (forecasting
that tight oil and shale gas resources will account for nearly 90% of total dry
natural gas production in the U.S. by 2050).
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2017,4 driving prices down.5 As a result, natural gas has become
more cost competitive as a fuel in electricity generation and other
applications, contributing to its substitution for coal. Between 2000
and 2017, electricity generation using natural gas increased by over
115 percent, while coal-fired generation declined by nearly thirtynine percent.6
This shift has had important public health and environmental
benefits because, compared to electricity generation using coal,
natural gas-fired generation results in fewer emissions of mercury
and other air toxins.7 It also emits approximately half as much
climate-damaging carbon dioxide as coal-fired generation.8
Nevertheless, natural gas is far from “climate-friendly,” with its
combustion emitting approximately 117 pounds of carbon dioxide
per million British thermal units (Btu) of energy produced.9
Moreover, natural gas production and transportation are also major

4

See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 2.
See Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdm.htm (last updated Feb. 5, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/J7FE-FDC6] (indicating that prices reached a high of $13.42 per
million British thermal units (Btu) in October 2005, but subsequently declined to
$2.95 per million Btu in March 2019).
6
See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., APRIL 2019 MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 125
(2019), https://perma.cc/7P2B-5FAN (indicating that, in 2000, 1,966,265 million
kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity was generated using coal and 601,038 million
kWh using natural gas, whereas in 2017, 1,205,835 million kWh of electricity was
generated using coal and 1,296,415 million Kwh using natural gas).
7
See RICHARD K. LATTANZIO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43860,
METHANE: AN INTRODUCTION TO EMISSION SOURCES AND REDUCTION
STRATEGIES 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/6NWV-AG4C.
8
See How Much Carbon Dioxide Is Produced When Different Fuels Are
Burned?, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=73&t=11
(last updated June 4, 2019) [https://perma.cc/5GM2-CHV4] (indicating that the coal
combustion emits 228.6 pounds of carbon dioxide per million Btu, while natural gas
combustion emits just 117.0 pounds).
9
See id.
5
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sources of methane,10 accounting for over one-quarter of total
United States emissions in 2017.11
Recognizing this and emphasizing the need to dramatically
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, in its Mid-Century Strategy for
Deep Decarbonization, the Obama administration argued that “a
rapid phase-out of . . . natural gas is required” (at least unless carbon
capture and sequestration technologies become widely available).12
However, that view is not shared by the Trump administration,
which has sought to boost natural gas production and use, including
by accelerating the permitting of new pipelines and other
infrastructure, purportedly needed to “efficiently, reliably, and cost
effectively transport” gas to domestic and international markets.13
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or
Commission) has primary responsibility for approving pipelines
used in the interstate transportation of natural gas (interstate
pipelines).14 Under section 7 of the Natural Gas Act (NGA), any
person wishing to construct or extend an interstate natural gas
pipeline must apply to FERC for a certificate of public convenience
10

Methane is a highly potent greenhouse gas, estimated to trap at least eightyfour times more heat in the earth’s atmosphere than carbon over a twenty-year
time horizon, on a pound-for-pound basis. See Rajendra K. Pachauri et al., Climate
Change 2014: Synthesis Report, in FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 87 (Rajendra K. Pachauri et
al. eds., IPCC 2014), https://perma.cc/DK4M-FBRL. Other studies have found the
twenty-year global warming potential of methane to be even higher. See, e.g.,
Robert W. Howarth et al., Methane and the Greenhouse Gas Footprint of Natural
Gas from Shale Formations, 106 CLIMATE CHANGE 679, 679, 683 (2011).
11
See EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS:
1990-2017, at ES-6 to ES-8 tbl. ES-2 (2019), https://perma.cc/96VK-WSHJ
(estimating total methane emissions in 2017 at 656.3 million metric tons of carbon
dioxide equivalent, of which natural gas systems were responsible for 165.6
million metric tons). Other studies suggest that methane emissions from natural
gas systems are even higher. See, e.g., Ramón A. Alvarez et al., Assessment of
Methane Emissions from the U.S. Oil and Gas Supply Chain, SCIENCE (June 21,
2018), https://science.sciencemag.org/content/361/6398/186.
12
WHITE HOUSE, UNITED STATES MID-CENTURY STRATEGY FOR DEEP
DECARBONIZATION 33 (2016), https://perma.cc/56U8-XZSE.
13
Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump is Paving the Way for Energy
WHITE
HOUSE
(Apr.
10,
2019),
Infrastructure
Development,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumppaving-way-energy-infrastructure-development/ [https://perma.cc/5B4H-AA3C].
14
See Natural Gas Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2012) (authorizing FERC to
regulate, among other things, “the transportation of natural gas in interstate
commerce”).
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and necessity which, as the name suggests, can only be issued where
the Commission determines that the pipeline “is or will be required
by the present or future public convenience and necessity.”15 To
make that determination, FERC must “evaluate all factors bearing
on the public interest”16 which necessitates a broad-ranging
assessment of the need for pipeline development, its benefits, and
its costs.17 FERC has described the assessment as involving two
separate reviews, one of which focuses on the economic
consequences of pipeline development, and the other on its
environmental impacts.18 FERC has indicated that it considers the
findings of both reviews when assessing whether pipeline
development is required by the public convenience and necessity
under section 7 of the NGA.19
FERC’s approval of pipeline projects has come under increased
scrutiny in recent years, primarily due to concerns that expanding
transportation capacity will lead to greater production and use of
natural gas, and associated greenhouse gas emissions.20 Debate has
raged both within and outside FERC over whether, and if so how,
the Commission should consider the greenhouse gas emissions
associated with “upstream” natural gas production and
“downstream” use when approving new pipelines.21 In several
recent approvals, FERC has refused to consider upstream and

15

Id.
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 8 (1961)
(“§ 7(e) requires the Commission to evaluate all factors bearing on the public
interest.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Atl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 360
U.S. 378, 391 (1959)).
17
See Statement of Policy, Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas
Pipelines, 88 FERC ¶ 61,227 (1999), clarified 90 FERC ¶ 61,128 (Feb. 9, 2000),
further clarified 92 FERC ¶ 61,094 (2000).
18
See id., ¶ 61,747 (indicating that economic and environmental impacts will
be considered “separately”); see also Order Clarifying Statement of Policy,
Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, 90 FERC ¶ 61,128, ¶ 61,397
(2000) (stating that the “environmental and economic review of a proposed project
will . . . proceed concurrently”).
19
See Notice of Inquiry, Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Facilities,
83 Fed. Reg. 18,020, 18,022 (Apr. 19, 2018).
20
See, e.g., Stopping Dirty Energy Infrastructure Investments, EARTHJUSTICE,
https://earthjustice.org/climate-and-energy/oil-gas-drilling/infrastructure (last
visited Feb. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/CZ38-XTKQ].
21
See, e.g., Dominion Transmission, Inc., Order Denying Rehearing, 163
FERC ¶ 61,128, ¶ 61,888 (2018).
16
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downstream emissions (except in limited circumstances),22
prompting court challenges from environmental groups and others
who assert that such emissions must be considered under NEPA.23
A number of scholars have also weighed in, debating the scope of
FERC’s NEPA obligations.24 Comparatively little attention has,
however, been devoted to FERC’s obligations under the NGA.25
That is the focus of this Article.
22

See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 61,700–01.
See, e.g., Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 26, Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1329); Petitioner’s
Joint Opening Brief at 38, Appalachian Voices v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, No. 17-1271, 2019 WL 847199 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2019); Otsego 2000
v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 767 Fed.Appx. 19, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(mem.); Brief of Petitioners at 37, Birckhead v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
925 F.3d 510 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1218); Joint Reply Brief of Petitioners at
13, Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, No. 18-1224
(D.C. Cir. July 10, 2019). Some recent court challenges have also alleged that
FERC’s failure to consider upstream and downstream emissions violates section 7
of the NGA. See, e.g., Appellants’ Opening Brief at 24, Del. Riverkeeper Network
v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 895 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No. 17-5084).
24
See, e.g., Aaron Flyer, FERC Compliance Under NEPA: FERC’s
Obligation to Fully Evaluate Upstream and Downstream Environmental Impacts
Associated with Siting Natural Gas Pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas
Terminals, 27 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 301, 308 (2015); Michael Burger &
Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The
Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 115 (2017); James
W. Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars: Reforming Environmental Assessment of
Energy Transport Infrastructure, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 119, 162, 164; Thien T.
Chau, Implications of the Trump Administration’s Withdrawal of the Final CEQ
Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of
Climate Change in NEPA Reviews, 30 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 713, 723–24
(2018).
25
To the author’s knowledge, only three previous papers have discussed
FERC’s consideration of upstream and downstream climate impacts under the
NGA. See STEVEN WEISSMAN & ROMANY WEBB, ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE
WITHOUT LEGISLATION: HOW THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
CAN USE ITS EXISTING LEGAL AUTHORITY TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND INCREASE CLEAN ENERGY USE 46–48 (2014),
https://perma.cc/LFV6-DZ3K (concluding that “FERC may evaluate the
greenhouse gas emissions resulting from production, transportation, and use of
natural gas when determining whether a proposed pipeline is in the public interest”
under section 7 of the NGA); JAYNI HEIN ET AL., PIPELINE APPROVALS AND
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 8–10 (2019), https://perma.cc/ZF4X-P44L
(asserting that “FERC should more fully incorporate environmental
considerations—and, in particular, the climate costs or benefits that results from
new or expanded natural gas pipelines—into its process for evaluating, approving,
or denying certificates for public convenience and necessity” under the NGA);
23
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The Article answers two key questions that have, to date, been
largely overlooked in the debate surrounding FERC’s approval of
interstate natural gas pipelines. First, how (if at all) are
environmental factors, including upstream and downstream
greenhouse gas emissions, currently considered by FERC when
issuing certificates of public convenience and necessity? And,
second, does FERC’s current approach meet the requirements of
section 7 of the NGA?
With respect to the first question, the Article provides an
in-depth analysis of FERC’s stated approach to evaluating
certificate applications, as set out in its 1999 Statement of Policy on
the Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines (1999
Policy Statement). The Article then explores how the 1999 Policy
Statement has been implemented in practice, based on a
comprehensive survey of all major pipeline projects certified by
FERC from 2014 to 2018.26 For each project, the author analyzed
FERC’s certification decision and supporting materials, including
any environmental documents prepared under NEPA. The analysis
shows that, despite FERC’s claims to consider both economic and
environmental factors when certifying pipelines, it often justifies its
certification decisions solely on economic grounds.27 Moreover,
even where environmental factors are considered, FERC typically
fails to assess the full range of climate impacts associated with
pipeline development, including upstream and downstream
greenhouse gas emissions.28
With respect to the second question, the Article argues that the
climate and other environmental impacts of pipeline development
must be considered under section 7 of the NGA. To support that
argument, the Article explores the history behind section 7, showing
that Congress intended it to confer broad authority on FERC to

Rich Glick & Matthew Christiansen, FERC and Climate Change, 40 ENERGY L.J.
1, 40 (2019) (stating that FERC “has authority to deny a section 7 certificate
application on the basis of its harm to the environment” (internal citations
omitted)).
26
FERC defines a “major” pipeline project as one that adds capacity to the
existing interstate natural gas pipeline system. See generally FED. ENERGY
REGULATORY COMM’N, NATURAL GAS PIPELINES: APPROVED MAJOR PIPELINE
PROJECTS (2015–PRESENT) (2019) https://ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/
pipelines/approved-projects.asp.
27
See infra Part III.
28
See infra Part III.
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consider the social consequences of pipeline development.29 While
the courts have recognized certain limits on the scope of FERC’s
review, they have repeatedly affirmed the importance of considering
environmental impacts, including downstream impacts.30 The
courts—and FERC itself—have long viewed downstream
environmental impacts as central to the assessment of whether
pipeline development is required by the public convenience and
necessity.31 Indeed, FERC’s predecessor—the Federal Power
Commission (FPC)—once described downstream environmental
impacts as “one of the most important factors” to be considered
when assessing the public convenience and necessity,32 and the
courts have agreed that evidence of such impacts should be given
“great weight” under section 7 of the NGA.33 The case law and
administrative materials, as well as the language and history of the
NGA, thus suggest that FERC cannot fulfill its statutory obligation
under section 7 without considering the full climate and other
environmental impacts of pipeline development.34 The requirement
to consider those impacts under section 7 of the NGA is independent
of, and not constrained by, NEPA.35
These points are elaborated further in the remainder of the
Article. Part I of the Article provides background on section 7 of the
NGA, exploring the history behind it, and how it has been
interpreted by the courts. Parts II and III then discuss FERC’s
implementation of section 7, reviewing its stated approach to
pipeline certification, as set out in the 1999 Policy Statement and
other recent orders, and assessing how environmental issues have
been considered in recent certification decisions. The legality of that
approach is explored in Part IV.

29

See infra Section I.B.
See infra Sections I.C, IV.A.
31
See infra Section I.C.
32
Transwestern Pipeline Co., Opinion and Order Granting and Denying
Certificates, 36 FPC 176, 213 (1966); see also infra Part IV.
33
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 18
(1961); see also infra Part IV.
34
See infra Part IV.
35
See infra Section IV.B.
30
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I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CERTIFYING
INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS PIPELINES
First enacted in 1938, the NGA declares “the business of
transporting and selling natural gas” to be “affected with a public
interest” and provides for federal regulation of interstate natural gas
transport and sales, finding this to be “necessary in the public
interest.”36 Regulatory authority was initially conferred on the FPC,
which was established by the 1920 Federal Water Power Act37 to
regulate hydroelectric projects in U.S. navigable waters,38 and was
subsequently charged with regulating certain other aspects of the
electricity industry under the Federal Power Act of 1935.39 Three
years later, with the passage of the NGA in 1938, the FPC’s
jurisdiction was further expanded to include natural gas.40
Subsequently, in 1977, federal regulation of the natural gas and
electricity industries was transferred to FERC.41 An independent
federal agency, FERC is comprised of five Commissioners, who are
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate.42 No more than three Commissioners may belong to the
same political party.43 Each is appointed for a five-year term and
may only be removed from office by the President on the grounds
of inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance.44
A. Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act
Section 7 of the NGA, entitled “Construction, extension, or
abandonment of facilities,” establishes the framework under which
FERC regulates the development and use of natural gas pipelines.45
36

Natural Gas Act of 1938 § 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2012).
See generally Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 16 U.S.C. § 791 (2012).
38
See 16 U.S.C. § 792 (“[A] commission is created and established to be
known as the Federal Power Commission”); see also id. § 797 (outlining the
powers of the FPC).
39
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 791a.
40
See id. § 717(b).
41
See Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7172
(2012).
42
See id. § 7171(a); see also Commission Members, FED. ENERGY
REGULATORY COMM’N, https://ferc.gov/about/com-mem.asp (last visited Feb. 2,
2020) (describing the appointments process).
43
See 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b)(1).
44
See id.
45
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 717f.
37
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Under section 1(b) of the NGA, FERC’s regulatory authority
extends to all pipelines used for the “transportation of natural gas in
interstate commerce,” which has been held to include pipelines
crossing state boundaries, as well as those located within a single
state that play a role in transporting gas between states (interstate
pipelines).46 FERC does not, however, have authority over pipelines
used solely for local natural gas distribution.47
Under section 7(c) of the NGA, before any interstate natural
gas pipeline is constructed or extended, a certificate of public
convenience and necessity must be obtained from FERC. The subsection provides, in relevant part:
(c) Certificate of public convenience and necessity.
(A) No natural-gas company or person which will be a
natural-gas company upon completion of any proposed
construction or extension shall engage in the transportation or
sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,
or undertake the construction or extension of any facilities
therefor, or acquire or operate any such facilities or extensions
thereof, unless there is in force with respect to such natural-gas
company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued
by the Commission authorizing such acts or operations . . .
(B) [T]he Commission shall set the matter for hearing and shall
give such reasonable notice of the hearing thereon to all
interested persons as in its judgment may be necessary under
rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Commission; and
the application shall be decided in accordance with the procedure
provided in subsection (e) of this section and such certificate
shall be issued or denied accordingly: Provided, however, That
the Commission may issue a temporary certificate in cases of
emergency, to assure maintenance of adequate service or to serve
particular customers, without notice or hearing, pending the
determination of an application for a certificate, and may by
regulation exempt from the requirements of this section
46

Natural Gas Act § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717 (stating that the Act applies to
“transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce”); see also Natural Gas Act
§ 2(7), 15 U.S.C. § 717a(7) (defining “interstate commerce” to mean “commerce
between any point in a State and any point outside thereof, or between points
within the same State but through any place outside thereof”).
47
See Natural Gas Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b); see also Suedeen Kelly & Vera
Callahan Neinast, Getting Gas to the People: The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s Permitting Process for Pipeline Infrastructure, in BEYOND THE
FRACKING WARS: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, PLANNERS, AND
CITIZENS 183, 186–87 (Beth E. Kinne & Erica Levine Powers eds., 2014).
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temporary acts or operations for which the issuance of a
certificate will not be required in the public interest.48

Section 7(d) of the NGA sets out the process by which persons
may apply for certificates of public convenience and necessity,
requiring applications to be made in writing and contain the
information specified in regulations adopted by FERC.49 As noted
above, under section 7(c)(1)(B) of the NGA, FERC must convene a
hearing on each certificate application (except in cases of
emergency).50 Following the hearing, FERC may grant an
application if satisfied that it meets the conditions specified in
section 7(e), which provides that a certificate can only be issued if:
the applicant is “able and willing” to construct and operate the
pipeline in accordance with the requirements of the NGA and
any rules or regulations adopted thereunder; and
construction and operation of the pipeline is “required by the
present or future public convenience and necessity.”51

The NGA does not define the term “public convenience and
necessity” nor set out any factors to be considered by FERC in
determining whether a pipeline meets that standard. However,
informed by both the history of the NGA and other statutes applying
the public convenience and necessity standard, FERC and the courts
have identified a number of relevant considerations.
B. Legislative History of Section 7
Since its enactment in 1938, the NGA has always included
provisions dealing with the certification of interstate natural gas
pipelines, though the scope of those provisions has changed over
time. As originally enacted, section 7(c) of the NGA only required
a sub-set of interstate pipelines, intended to be used “for the
transportation of natural gas to a market in which natural gas is
already being served by another natural-gas company,” to be
certified by the former FPC.52 Like its present-day counterpart, the
48

Natural Gas Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c).
See id. § 7(d), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(d).
50
See id. § 7(c)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(B).
51
Id. § 7(c)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e).
52
Natural Gas Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-688, § 7(c), 52 Stat. 821, 825
(1938) (prior to 1942 amendment). The FPC took a fairly broad view of its pipeline
certification authority, concluding that the phrase “market in which natural gas is
already being served” was not intended to refer “only [to] those communities in
which there are presently existing facilities for the transportation or sale of natural
49
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original version of section 7(c) directed the FPC, when issuing
certificates, to apply the public convenience and necessity standard.
While that standard has never been defined in the NGA, the original
version of section 7(c) did provide some guidance on its meaning,
stating:
In passing on applications for certificates of public convenience
and necessity, the [FPC] shall give due consideration to the
applicant’s ability to render and maintain adequate service at
rates lower than those prevailing in the territory to be served, it
being the intention of Congress that natural gas shall be sold in
interstate commerce for resale for ultimate public consumption
for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use at the
lowest possible reasonable rate consistent with the maintenance
of adequate service in the public interest.53

The legislative history of the NGA indicates that section 7(c)
was intended to confer broad authority on the FPC to consider the
public interest when certifying pipelines. Both the House and Senate
reports on the NGA described the section as “similar [to the]
provisions requiring certificates of public convenience and
necessity . . . in the Interstate Commerce Act”54 and other federal
and state statutes which had, at the time, been interpreted by the
courts as requiring an assessment of whether certification would be
“in the interest of the public.”55 While the reports did not expressly
endorse that interpretation, Congress’s decision to apply the same
standard may be taken as tacit approval.56
gas,” but rather to any “territory within which a natural gas company can
economically render adequate service by reasonable extensions of its facilities.”
See Re Kan. Pipe Line & Gas Co., 2 FPC 29, 35 (1939), 1939 WL 1374.
53
Natural Gas Act § 7(c), 52 Stat. 821, 825 (1938) (prior to 1942 amendment).
54
H.R. REP. NO. 709 (1937); S. REP. NO. 1162 (1937); see also H.R. REP. NO.
1290, at 2 (1941).
55
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 35, 42 (1931)
(holding that the ICC is authorized to certify projects “in the interests of the
public”).
56
The courts have consistently held that, where Congress elects to use words
with a well-established meaning in a statute, it is taken to have intended the words
to be given that meaning. See, e.g., Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106,
115 (1939) (“[W]here words are employed in an act which had at the time a wellknown meaning in the law, they are used in that sense unless the context requires
the contrary.”); Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944)
(stating that Congress’s “adoption of the wording of a statute from another
legislative jurisdiction carries with it the previous judicial interpretations of the
wording”).
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Consistent with this view, the FPC based its early decisions
under section 7(c) on an assessment of “public need and benefit,”
which it held required a review of “many and varied factors.”57 The
FPC did, however, acknowledge important limits on the scope of its
review. Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, in its 1939
decision in Re Kansas Pipe Line and Gas Company (Kansas Pipe
Line Decision), the FPC concluded that it lacked authority to
consider certain downstream impacts of pipeline development.58
Briefly, the Kansas Pipe Line Decision concerned two
pipelines intended to transport natural gas from central North
Dakota to western Minnesota, where it would be used in various
industrial and other applications.59 Providers of competing fuels
(e.g., coal) and transportation services (e.g., railways) objected to
pipeline development on the grounds that it would lead to a
reduction in the use of their fuels or services and thus adversely
affect their economic interests.60 The FPC determined that it lacked
authority to consider such downstream impacts when certifying the
pipelines, reasoning that its jurisdiction under section 7(c) was
limited to cases involving competition among natural gas
companies, suggesting that “Congress did not intend [it] generally
to weigh the broad social and economic effects of the use of various
fuels.”61
In its 1940 Annual Report to Congress, the FPC expressed
concern that, without considering downstream impacts, it could not
ensure pipeline development is in the public interest and thus
achieve the goals of the NGA.62 In response, Congress amended the
NGA in 1942, enacting a revised version of section 7(c), and new
57

Re Kan. Pipe Line & Gas Co., 2 FPC at 38, 56.
See id. at 57.
59
See id. at 33.
60
See id. at 57.
61
Id.
62
See FED. POWER COMM’N, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
POWER COMMISSION 10 (1940) (noting that the Commission lacks authority to
consider “important problems” regarding the downstream impacts of pipeline
development, including “whether the proposed use of natural gas would not result
in displacing” other fuels); see also id. at 10, 78 (stating that the limited scope of
section 7(c) “has serious disadvantages in terms of the general purposes of the
Natural Gas Act” and indicating that “[i]n order to make possible more effective
protection of the public interest in connection with the transportation and sale of
natural gas in interstate commerce . . . section 7(c) of the Act should be broadened
to give the Commission control over all new interstate pipeline construction”).
58
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subsections 7(d) through (g).63 Those provisions have undergone
only minor amendments since.64
The 1942 amendment expanded the scope of section 7(c) of the
NGA, requiring all new interstate natural gas pipelines to be
certified by the FPC.65 The amendment also removed the direction,
previously found in section 7(c), that the FPC consider “the
applicant’s ability to render and maintain adequate service at rates
lower than those prevailing in the territory to be served” when
certifying pipelines.66 In place of that directive, Congress enacted a
new section 7(e), which set out a two-stage test for issuing
certificates, requiring the FPC to consider (1) whether the applicant
is able and willing to construct and operate the pipeline and (2)
whether pipeline construction and operation is or will be required
by the public convenience and necessity.67 While that is the same
standard as had appeared in the original version of section 7 of the
NGA, it is clear from Congressional debate that the 1942
amendment was intended to expand the range of factors that could
be considered by FERC in its certification decisions.
In its report on the 1942 amendment, the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce (House Committee) noted that the
original version of section 7 had proved difficult to administer
because the FPC’s jurisdiction was limited to a subset of pipelines,
and that limitation prevented it from considering all relevant factors
when issuing certificates of public convenience and necessity.68 The
House Committee indicated that amending section 7 would enable
the FPC to consider a broader range of factors, including the
63

See Act of Feb. 7, 1942, ch. 49, Pub. L. No. 444, 56 Stat. 83.
Section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act underwent minor amendments in 1978.
See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 608, 92
Stat. 3117, 3173 (1978).
65
See Natural Gas Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(A) (2012).
66
Id.
67
See id. § 717f(e).
68
See H.R. REP. NO. 1290-2 (1941) (“The difficulties encountered in the
administration of the present statutory provision arise out of the limitation of the
scope of the section to ‘a market in which natural gas is already being served by
another natural gas company.’ . . . Administration of the present statute, therefore,
involves tedious and time-consuming preliminary investigations and hearings in
order to determine whether the Commission has jurisdiction to consider, on the
merits, the granting or denying of the certificate. The limitation, moreover, . . . has
been held by the Commission to have the effect of excluding from consideration
the interests of producers of competing fuels and competitive methods of
transportation.”).
64
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upstream and downstream impacts of pipeline development, for
example, on “producers of competing fuels, and competitive
transportation interests.”69 Similarly, the Senate report also
described the amendment as enabling a broader review by the FPC,
indicating that “i[t] would . . . authorize the Commission to examine
costs, finances, necessity, feasibility, and adequacy of proposed
service.”70 While Congress was primarily concerned about
economic impacts, as we shall see below, the courts interpreted the
new section 7 to require a broader-ranging review of all factors
bearing on the public interest, including environmental factors.71
C. Judicial Precedent on Section 7
As discussed in Section I.B above, even before enactment of
the NGA, the public convenience and necessity standard had been
used in numerous other statutes. The standard first appeared in an
1882 Massachusetts statute, which empowered the state Board of
Railroad Commissioners to authorize new rail-lines, after certifying
that the “public convenience and necessity require construction of
[the line] proposed.”72 Other states soon enacted their own
certification regimes, many of which applied to a range of so-called
“public services,” including telecommunications, electricity, and
natural gas.73 The operation of those regimes has been the subject of
much previous study.74 One study, based on a comprehensive
review of early regulatory decisions applying the public
convenience and necessity standard, found that state regulators
universally interpreted the standard as requiring “an inquiry into
whether there is a public need for, or whether it would be in the
public interest to authorize, the new or expanded services proposed

69

Id. at 3.
S. REP. NO. 985-2 (1942).
71
See infra Section I.C.
72
1882 Mass. Acts 208.
73
See William K. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity: Developments in the States 1870–1920, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 426, 455
(1979) (noting that, by 1920, at least thirty-three states had statutes providing for
the issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity in one or more
public service industries).
74
See, e.g., id.; Ford P. Hall, Certificates of Convenience and Necessity, 28
MICH. L. REV. 276 (1930); FORD P. HALL, THE CONCEPT OF A BUSINESS AFFECTED
WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST (1940); FORD P. HALL, STATE CONTROL OF BUSINESS
THROUGH CERTIFICATES OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY (1948).
70
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by the applicant.”75 This inquiry was intended to, among other
things, ensure “protection of the community against social costs”
and thus included consideration of any “environmental damage”
likely to result from the provision of services.76
Federal regulators charged with issuing certificates of public
convenience and necessity have also interpreted that standard as
requiring a broad-ranging public interest review. That interpretation
has been consistently upheld by the courts. Many of the early court
cases arose under the Interstate Commerce Act, which empowered
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to grant certificates
authorizing the construction or extension of interstate rail-lines and
the provision of certain other transportation services, where required
by the public convenience and necessity. The Interstate Commerce
Act did not, however, specify any factors to be considered by the
ICC when determining whether that requirement had been met.77
Given this, the courts interpreted the Interstate Commerce Act as
conferring broad discretion on the ICC to determine whether a
particular project should be certified, based on its unique
characteristics.78 The ICC took a case-by-case approach, weighing
each project’s costs and benefits79 to determine whether it would
deliver “material advantages to the public,”80 or otherwise be “in the

75

Jones, supra note 73, at 427 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 428, 511.
77
See id.; see also Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 35,
42 (1931) (“There is no specification [in the Interstate Commerce Act] of the
considerations by which the Commission is to be governed in determining whether
the public convenience and necessity require the proposed construction.”).
78
See Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 166 (1926) (“[T]he making of
this determination [i.e., whether a project should be certified] involves an exercise
of judgment upon the facts of the particular case.”); see also United States v.
Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Co., 326 U.S. 236, 241 (1945) (holding that the
ICC “has been entrusted with a wide range of discretionary authority” to certify
projects and must base its certification decisions on the facts of the particular case);
Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 64 (1945) (holding that the
Interstate Commerce Act “gives administrative discretion to the Commission to
draw its conclusion [as to whether a project is required by the public convenience
and necessity] from the infinite variety of circumstances which may occur in
specific instances”).
79
See Colorado, 271 U.S. at 169 (holding that the ICC’s determination “is
made upon a balancing of the respective interests”).
80
Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382, 392 (1932)
(holding that the ICC may grant a certificate for a project where “material
advantages to the public would result”).
76
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interest of the public.”81 The public interest was the touchstone for
certification decisions under the Interstate Commerce Act, with the
U.S. Supreme Court holding that the ICC acts as the ultimate
“arbiter” of the public interest when issuing certificates of public
convenience and necessity.82
The courts have taken a similar view of FERC’s role in
certifying interstate natural gas pipelines, holding that section 7 of
the NGA requires it to act as the “guardian” of the public interest.83
Like the ICC, FERC has been held to have “broad discretion” to
decide whether certification is in the public interest, based on the
specific facts of each case.84 According to the Supreme Court,
FERC is required “not only to appraise the facts and to draw
inferences from them but also to bring to bear upon the problem an
expert judgement to determine from its analysis of the total situation
on which side of the controversy the public interest lies.”85 This
necessitates a broad-ranging review, with the Supreme Court
holding that FERC must “evaluate all factors bearing on the public
interest.”86 The Court has, however, recognized certain limits on the
scope of FERC’s public interest review.
In NAACP v. FPC, the Supreme Court held that, in the context
of the NGA, the public interest standard does not give the former
FPC (now FERC) “a broad license to promote the general

81
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 283 U.S. at 42 (holding that the ICC is
authorized to certify projects “in the interests of the public”).
82
See, e.g., United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515,
535–36 (1946) (holding that, in issuing certificates, the ICC acts as “the arbiter[]
of the paramount public interest”); Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Co., 326 U.S.
at 241 (holding that the ICC “is the guardian of the public interest in determining
whether certificates of convenience and necessity shall be granted”).
83
See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 7
(1961) (“The Commission is the guardian of the public interest in determining
whether certificates of convenience and necessity shall be granted.”); see also
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 386 F.2d 607, 610 (3d Cir.
1967 (holding that “the public interest is always involved” in certification
decisions and indicating that “the Commission, as its guardian, must determine in
every proceeding whether the certificate applied for is in the public interest or
whether that interest calls for some other disposition”).
84
See Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 762 F.3d 97, 111 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
85
Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. at 7.
86
Atl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 360 U.S. 378, 391 (1959); see also
Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. at 8 (affirming Atl. Ref. Co.).
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welfare.”87 Rather, it mandates that the FPC take steps to advance
the goals of the NGA, chief among which is “encourag[ing] the
orderly development of plentiful supplies of . . . natural gas at
reasonable prices.”88 The Supreme Court described this as the
“principal purpose” of the NGA, but recognized that the Act also
has several “subsidiary purposes” relating to “conservation,
environmental, and antitrust” issues.89 The court indicated—in
obiter dicta—that the FPC “has authority to consider those
[subsidiary] issues.”90 However, the Court ruled that the FPC lacks
authority to consider other issues, which do not have a clear nexus
with its regulation under the NGA (e.g., employment
discrimination).91
Subsequent decisions have interpreted NAACP as requiring the
FPC—and later FERC—to limit its review to factors bearing
directly on its exercise of regulatory authority under the NGA.92
However, this still leaves FERC with significant latitude to consider
a wide variety of factors to determine whether pipeline development
would further the NGA’s objectives of ensuring plentiful natural gas

87

NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1976). While NAACP
did not specifically discuss the public convenience and necessity standard, other
decisions have confirmed that its reasoning applies to section 7 of the NGA. See,
e.g., Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety, 762 F.3d at 101 (D.C. Cir. 2014);
Meyersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 783
F.3d 1301, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Interstate Commerce Comm’n v.
Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 69 (1945) (holding that, as used in the Interstate Commerce
Act, “[p]ublic convenience and necessity should be interpreted so as to secure for
the Nation the broad aims of the . . . Act”).
88
NAACP, 425 U.S. at 669–70.
89
Id. at 670 n.6.
90
Id.; see also Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty., 783 F.3d at 1307
(“Congress enacted the Natural Gas Act . . . with the principal purpose of
encouraging the orderly development of plentiful supplies of natural gas at
reasonable prices. . . . Subsidiary purposes include respecting conservation,
environmental, and antitrust limitations.” (internal citations omitted)).
91
See NAACP, 425 U.S. at 664 (holding that the FPC does not have authority
to address employment discrimination, because there is insufficient “nexus”
between the Commission’s “economic regulatory activities and the employment
procedures of the utility systems” it regulates).
92
See Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 900
F.2d 269, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the former FPC (now FERC) must
focus on factors relevant to the “main purposes of the Natural Gas Act,” in which
the Commission “fairly may be said to have expertise”).
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supplies, while also minimizing any adverse economic or
environmental impacts.93
The courts have consistently identified the environmental
impacts of pipeline development, including upstream and
downstream impacts, as relevant to FERC’s determination of public
convenience and necessity under section 7 of the NGA. Perhaps
most notable is the Supreme Court’s 1961 decision in FPC v.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp (Transcontinental), which
concerned the then-FPC’s refusal to certify a pipeline intended to
transport natural gas from Texas to New York, where it would be
used to fuel industrial boilers that were previously fueled by coal.94
Supporters argued that the pipeline was required by the public
convenience and necessity because, among other things, switching
from coal to natural gas would reduce sulfur dioxide emissions and
thus improve local air quality.95 The FPC acknowledged this
potential benefit, but ultimately decided that it was outweighed by
the negative impacts of pipeline development, and thus refused to
issue a certificate.96 While upholding that decision, the Supreme
Court emphasized that the potential for improved air quality was a
relevant consideration under the public convenience and necessity
standard, and “was entitled to [be given] great weight” by the FPC.97
Despite this, however, FERC often fails to consider downstream
climate impacts when certifying new pipeline projects.98
II. FERC’S APPROACH TO NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CERTIFICATION
FERC has long interpreted the public convenience and
necessity standard as requiring a case-by-case assessment to
93
See, e.g., S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 621 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 2010) (“FERC must consider all factors
bearing on the public interest consistent with its mandate to fulfill the statutory
purpose of the NGA.”).
94
See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 8
(1961).
95
See id. at 4–5.
96
See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., Order Denying Certificate of Pub.
Convenience & Necessity, 21 FPC 138, 142 (1959) (holding that “[a]lthough . . .
the idea of ameliorating a smoke condition found unpleasant and annoying . . . is
an attractive one, more weighty considerations compel denial of the grant” of a
certificate for the pipeline).
97
Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. at 29.
98
See infra Parts II, III.
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determine whether, on balance, pipeline development will serve the
public interest.99 For the last two decades, FERC’s assessment has
been guided by the 1999 Policy Statement, which describes the
goals of pipeline certification as being to “foster competitive
markets, protective captive customers, and avoid unnecessary
environmental and community impacts.”100 To ensure achievement
of those goals and consistent with the broad authority conferred by
section 7 of the NGA, the 1999 Policy Statement requires
certification decisions to be based on a wide-ranging assessment of
the need for pipeline development, its benefits, and costs.101 The
1999 Policy Statement envisages that FERC will conduct two
separate reviews of each pipeline project—i.e., one focusing on the
project’s economic impacts (the economic review) and the other on
its environmental consequences (the environmental review)102—
and consider the findings of both when determining whether the
project should be certified.103 In April 2018, FERC commenced an
inquiry into whether, and if so how, it should revise its approach in
light of recent changes in the natural gas industry.104 That inquiry
was ongoing at the time of writing.
A. FERC’s Economic Review
Under the 1999 Policy Statement, where a pipeline project is to
be developed by an existing pipeline operator, FERC’s economic
review must begin with an assessment of whether the project “can
proceed without subsidies” from the developer’s existing
99
See Statement of Policy, Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas
Pipelines, 88 FERC ¶ 61,227, ¶ 61,737 (1999).
100
Id. FERC has described the two reviews as “independent,” but indicated that
they will occur concurrently. See id. ¶ 61,749 (stating that FERC will conduct “an
independent environmental review of projects”); see also Order Clarifying
Statement of Policy, Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, 90
FERC ¶ 61,128, ¶ 61,397 (2000) (“[E]nvironmental and economic review of a
proposed project will . . . proceed concurrently.”).
101
See Statement of Policy, Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas
Pipelines, 88 FERC ¶ 61,227, ¶ 61,745 (1999).
102
See id. ¶ 61,746.
103
See id. ¶ 61,743 (“In reaching a final determination on whether a project
will be in the public convenience and necessity, the commission performs a
flexible balancing process during which it weighs the factors presented in a
particular application,” including its “economic” and “environmental impact[s].”).
104
See Notice of Inquiry, Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Facilities,
83 Fed. Reg. 18,020 (Apr. 19, 2018).
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customers.105 The developer must establish that the project can
“stand on its own financially,” which is typically done by pointing
to the existence of pre-construction contracts, under which new
customers have subscribed to the additional capacity made available
by the project, thus demonstrating market need for it.106
If satisfied that a pipeline project is financially viable, FERC
must then assess its economic impacts.107 FERC focuses on the
potential for adverse impacts on the economic interests of three key
groups as follows:
the developer’s existing customers (if any), considering whether
the project will lead to an increase in the rates they pay and/or
result in a degradation of service;108
competing pipelines and their existing customers, considering
whether the project will lead to unsubscribed capacity on any
existing pipeline, which must be paid for by its captive
customers;109 and
landowners and surrounding communities, considering whether
the project will affect their property rights, for example, by
resulting in the taking of land under eminent domain110
(together the affected groups).

105

Statement of Policy, Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines,
88 FERC ¶ 61,227, ¶ 61,745 (1999).
106
Id. ¶ 61,746. In the 1999 Policy Statement, FERC indicated that other
evidence could also be relied upon to demonstrate a need for the project, including
“demand projections” and “comparison[s] of projected demand with the amount of
capacity currently serving the market.” See id. ¶61,747. In practice, however, FERC
typically relies exclusively on pre-construction contracts to determine project need.
This approach has been heavily criticized by environmental groups and others who
argue that it may result in the certification of new pipelines that are not needed to
meet future natural gas demand and thus not in the public interest. See, e.g., Letter
from Montina Cole, Senior Attorney, Nat. Resource Def. Council et al., to Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Apr. 18. 2018), https://perma.cc/Y6KT-EHS7; Letter
from Jessica Wentz & Romany Webb, Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change Law, to Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n (June 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/634L-TSJY; Letter
from Jennifer Danis, E. Envtl. Law Ctr., et. al., to Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n
(June 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/NKH2-XM5E; Letter from Maura Healey,
Attorney Gen. of Mass., et. al. to Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (June 25, 2018),
https://perma.cc/7KKL-URHF [hereinafter AG Comments]; see also Notice of
Inquiry, Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, 163 FERC ¶ 61,042
(2018).
107
See Statement of Policy, 88 FERC, ¶ 61,745.
108
Id. ¶ 61,747.
109
Id. ¶ 61,748.
110
Id.
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FERC expects developers to take steps to mitigate adverse
impacts on the affected groups and evaluates the steps taken as part
of its economic review.111 If FERC determines that there will be
residual adverse impacts (i.e., after mitigation), it weighs those
impacts against the project’s benefits.112 Only if the project’s
benefits outweigh its residual adverse impacts can FERC find that it
is in the public interest and issue a certificate of public convenience
and necessity under section 7 of the NGA.113
Consistent with FERC’s case-by-case approach to pipeline
certification, the 1999 Policy Statement does not include an
exhaustive list of benefits to be considered in all decisions,114 and
merely states:
The type of public benefits that might be shown are quite diverse
but could include meeting unserved demand, eliminating
bottlenecks, [providing] access to new supplies, lower[ing] costs
to consumers, providing new interconnects that improve the
interstate grid, providing competitive alternatives, increasing
electric reliability, or advancing clean air objectives.115

Despite the broad range of factors listed, the 1999 Policy
Statement describes the balancing process as “essentially an
economic test” and states that other, non-economic impacts will be
considered separately.116 Thus, for example, FERC conducts an
111

See id. ¶ 61,745.
See id.
113
See id. The 1999 Policy Statement indicates that, where a project will have
significant adverse impacts, FERC will require a “greater . . . showing of public
benefits” to balance those impacts. Id. ¶ 61,749. In practice, however, FERC often
approves projects that have significant adverse impacts without requiring a
heightened showing of public benefit. This has, again, prompted criticism from
environmental groups and others. See AG Comments, supra note 106, at 22.
114
See generally Policy Statement, 88 FERC, ¶ 61,749 (“It is difficult to
construct helpful bright line standards or tests . . . . Bright line tests are unlikely to
be flexible enough to resolve specific cases and to allow the Commission to take
into account the different interests that must be considered.”).
115
Id. ¶ 61,748.
116
Id. ¶ 61,745 (“[The] balancing . . . of public benefits to be achieved against
the residual adverse effects . . . is essentially an economic test. Only when the
benefits outweigh the adverse effects on economic interests will the Commission
then proceed to complete the environmental analysis where other interests are
considered.”); see also id. at ¶ 61,747 (noting that that non-economic interests,
including environmental interests, “may need to be separately considered in a
certificate proceeding”). FERC later clarified that the economic and environmental
reviews would occur concurrently. See Order Clarifying Statement of Policy,
Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, 90 FERC ¶ 61,128, ¶ 61,397
112
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independent environmental review of each project under NEPA.117
FERC has indicated that it considers the results of that
environmental review, along with the economic assessment, when
determining whether a project is required by the public convenience
and necessity.118
B. FERC’s Environmental Review
Signed into law in 1970, NEPA “makes environmental
protection a part of the mandate of every federal agency,” including
FERC.119 NEPA seeks to, among other things, ensure that FERC and
other federal agencies consider the environmental impacts of their
actions and inform the public of those impacts. Under section
102(2)(C) of NEPA, when proposing legislation or undertaking
other “major federal actions”120 significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment,” federal agencies must publish a statement
(environmental impacts statement or EIS) addressing:
(i) The environmental impacts of the proposed action;
(ii) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented;
(iii) Alternatives to the proposed action;

(2000) (indicating that FERC “will begin its environmental review at the time an
application is filed with the Commission; environmental and economic review of
a proposed project will continue to proceed concurrently”).
117
The environmental review occurs currently with, but independently of, the
economic review. See Order Clarifying Statement of Policy, 90 FERC, ¶ 61,397.
118
See Policy Statement, 88 FERC, ¶ 61,743 (“In reaching a final determination
on whether a project will be in the public convenience and necessity, the
commission performs a flexible balancing process during which it weighs the
factors presented in a particular application,” including its “economic” and
“environmental impact[s].”).
119
Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n,
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
120
The term “federal action” includes any action that is undertaken, authorized,
or funded by a federal agency. See Major Federal Actions, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18
(2010) (defining the term “[m]ajor federal action” to include “actions with effects
that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and
responsibility . . . Federal actions tend to fall within one of the following
categories: (a) Adoption of official policy, such as rules, regulations, and
interpretations . . . (b) Adoption of formal plans, such as official documents
prepared or approved by federal agencies which guide or prescribe alternative uses
of Federal resources . . . (c) Adoption of programs, such as a group of concerted
actions to implement a specific policy or plan . . . (d) Approval of specific projects,
such as construction or management activities.”).
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(iv) The relationship between local short-term uses of man’s
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity; and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.121

The scope of this requirement has been discussed extensively
by other authors and will not be examined in detail in this paper.122
For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to note that FERC’s
approval of pipeline projects constitutes a federal action under
section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, meaning that an EIS must be prepared
for any project that will significantly affect the environment. FERC
regulations indicate that an EIS will “normally” be prepared for
“major pipeline construction projects . . . using rights-of-way in
which there is no existing natural gas pipeline.”123 An EIS may also
be prepared for other pipeline projects if FERC determines, based
on an initial environmental assessment (EA), that the project will
have significant environmental effects.124
EISs must be prepared in accordance with regulations issued
by the White House Council on Environmental Quality.125 Under
the regulations, EISs must discuss three types of environmental
effects, namely:
direct effects, which are “caused by the action and occur at the
same time and place;”126

121

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C) (2012).
122
For an overview of NEPA and its implementation, see Daniel R. Mandelker,
The National Environmental Policy Act: A Review of Its Experience and Problems,
32 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 293 (2010).
123
18 C.F.R. § 380.6(a)(3) (2016).
124
See id. § 380.5(a)–(b)(1). The 1999 Policy Statement envisages that FERC
will only prepare an EA or EIS for projects that its economic analysis shows are
in the public interest. See 1999 Policy Statement, supra note 17, ¶ 61,746 (“Only
when the benefits outweigh the adverse effects on economic interests will the
Commission then proceed to complete the environmental analysis where other
interests are considered.”); see also id. ¶ 61,744 (stating that, if FERC finds a
project’s benefits to outweigh its adverse effects, it will then “proceed . . . to
complete an [EA]) or [EIS] (whichever is required in the case)”).
125
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500–08 (2019).
126
Id. § 1508.8(a).
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indirect effects, which are “caused by the action and are later in
time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably
foreseeable;”127 and
cumulative effects, which “result[] from the incremental impact
of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable actions regardless of what agency (Federal or nonFederal) or person undertakes such other actions.”128

FERC views the greenhouse gas emissions associated with
pipeline construction and operation as a direct effect of pipeline
projects which must be considered under NEPA.129 FERC has
historically viewed upstream and downstream greenhouse gas
emissions—i.e., resulting from the production and consumption of
natural gas to be transported via pipeline projects—as falling
beyond the scope of its NEPA analysis.130 Recently however, the
courts have held that downstream emissions are an indirect effect of
pipeline projects and thus must be considered under NEPA, at least
in some circumstances.131
The leading case on this issue is Sierra Club v. FERC, which
concerned the Commission’s approval of three interstate pipelines,
intended to transport natural gas from Alabama to Florida (the
Southeast Market Pipelines Project).132 Noting that the pipelines
would be used to deliver natural gas to electric generating units, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that combustion of the gas
is not only a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the Southeast
Market Pipelines Project, but is its “entire purpose.”133 Moreover,
according to the court, it is reasonably foreseeable that natural gas
combustion will emit greenhouse gases that contribute to climate
change.134 The court viewed FERC’s approval of the Southeast
Market Pipelines Project as a “legally relevant cause” of the
127
Id. § 1508.8(b). The regulations provide that “[i]ndirect effects may include
growth inducing effects and other effects related to induced changes in the pattern
of land use, population density or growth rate, and related effects on air and water
and other natural systems, including ecosystems.” Id.
128
Id. § 1508.7.
129
See Dominion Transmission, Inc., Order Denying Rehearing, 163 FERC ¶
61,128, ¶¶ 61,695–96 (2018).
130
See infra Part IV.
131
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357
(D.C. Cir. 2017).
132
See id. at 1363–64.
133
Id. at 1372.
134
See id.
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emissions, reasoning that the Commission has authority to consider
the environmental impacts of pipeline development as part of its
certification decision, and “could deny a . . . certificate on the
grounds that the pipeline would be too harmful to the
environment.”135 Thus, the court held that downstream greenhouse
gas emissions are an indirect effect of the Southeast Market
Pipelines Project, which must be considered under NEPA.136 To
meet the requirements of NEPA, FERC must either provide “a
quantitative estimate” of the downstream emissions or “explain . . .
in detail” why such an estimate cannot be provided.137
Following the ruling in Sierra Club, until May 2018, FERC’s
policy was to estimate downstream greenhouse gas emissions in the
EAs and EISs prepared for pipeline projects.138 Where FERC lacked
information about the intended use of the natural gas transported via
a project, it provided an upper-bound estimate of downstream
emissions, assuming full combustion of the transported gas.139
However, in a three-to-two decision handed down in May 2018 (the
May 2018 Order), FERC determined that such estimates should no
longer be provided because, in its view, they are “inherently
speculative” and, for this and other reasons, are not required by
NEPA.140 FERC interpreted the ruling in Sierra Club narrowly,
holding that it only requires downstream emissions to be estimated
where the Commission has detailed information regarding how the
transported natural gas will be used and knows with certainty that it
will be combusted.141 Thus, for example, FERC has indicated that it
will not consider downstream emissions in situations where natural
gas will be delivered to local distribution companies.142 According
135

Id. at 1373.
See id. at 1374.
137
Id. at 1374–75.
138
All but one of the EAs or EISs issued by FERC during this period included
an estimate of downstream greenhouse gas emissions. The one exception was an
EA that was finalized less than one month after the ruling in Sierra Club. See infra
Part III.
139
See Dominion Transmission, Inc., Order Denying Rehearing, 163 FERC ¶
61,128, ¶ 61,705 (2018) (La Fleur, dissenting in part).
140
Id. ¶ 61,695. A lawsuit challenging the May 2018 Order was dismissed by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on the grounds that the plaintiff
lacked standing; the court did not reach the merits of the case. See Otsego 2000 v.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 767 Fed. Appx. 19, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (mem.).
141
See Dominion Transmission, Inc., 163 FERC, ¶ 61,700.
142
See id.
136
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to FERC, because those companies may sell natural gas to various
residential and industrial consumers, it cannot know with certainty
how the gas will be used, and whether use will result in additional
downstream emissions.143 In these circumstances, then, FERC takes
the view that downstream emissions are not a reasonably
foreseeable effect of pipeline development and thus fall outside the
scope of its indirect effects analysis under NEPA.144
FERC has taken a similar approach to upstream greenhouse gas
emissions associated with natural gas production. In its May 2018
Order, FERC indicated that it would only consider upstream
emissions as part of its indirect effects analysis where the natural
gas transported via a pipeline project is shown to have originated
from a specific source and reflects new production, which would not
have occurred absent pipeline development (i.e., because there is no
other way to transport the gas to market).145 FERC concluded that,
in all other cases, upstream emissions cannot be considered an
indirect effect of pipeline development, including because such
development does not cause new drilling or the associated
emissions.146 Moreover, according to FERC, upstream emissions
are only reasonably foreseeable where the Commission knows the
origin of the transported natural gas.147
The above approach was considered by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Birckhead v. FERC.148 The case
concerned FERC’s refusal to assess upstream and downstream
greenhouse gas emissions as part of its environmental review of a
natural gas compression facility intended to increase the
transportation capacity of existing gas pipelines in the southeast.
While the case was ultimately dismissed on procedural grounds, the
court indicated that it was “troubled” by FERC’s refusal to assess
upstream and downstream emissions.149 The court noted that FERC
143

See id.; see also, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR MIDSHIP PIPELINE COMPANY, LLC—
MIDCONTINENT SUPPLY HEADER INTERSTATE PIPELINE PROJECT 4–191 (2018),
https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=14953305.
144
See id.; see also Dominion Transmission, Inc., 163 FERC, ¶¶ 61,695–96.
145
See Dominion Transmission, Inc., 163 FERC, ¶ 61,699.
146
See id.
147
See id.
148
See Birckhead v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 925 F.3d 510 (D.C. Cir.
2019).
149
Id. at 519.
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justified its refusal by pointing to a lack of information about the
source and destination of the transported natural gas, but had failed
to request such information from the facility developer, and opined
that NEPA “requires the Commission to at least attempt to obtain
the information necessary to fulfill its statutory responsibilities.”150
Notably, the court also rejected FERC’s claims that downstream
emissions need only be considered where the available information
shows that the transported natural gas will be burned at a specific
location, and will not replace existing gas supplies or other higheremitting fuels.151
The decision in Birckhead was welcomed by FERC
Commissioner Glick,152 who dissented in part from the May 2018
Order.153 In another dissenting opinion, Commissioner La Fleur
argued that FERC should estimate upstream and downstream
greenhouse gas emissions, even where it lacks information about the
specific source and use of the transported natural gas.154 Similarly,
Commissioner Glick also advocated for estimation of upstream and
downstream emissions, asserting that FERC “cannot determine
whether a natural gas pipeline is in the public interest without
considering the effect . . . [it] will have on climate change.”155
However, as we will see below, FERC rarely considers climate
change effects when deciding whether to approve pipeline projects
under section 7 of the NGA.

150

Id. at 520.
See id. at 519–20 (holding that FERC “is wrong to suggest that downstream
emissions are not reasonably foreseeable simply because the gas transported by
the project may displace existing natural gas suppliers or higher-emitting fuels”
and to read Sierra Club as holding that “downstream emissions are an indirect
effect of a project only when the project’s entire purpose is to transport gas to be
burned at specifically-identified destinations”).
152
See, e.g., Maya Weber, DC Circuit Upholds US FERC Orders in GHG
Case, Offers ‘Misgivings’ on NEPA Effort, S&P GLOBAL (June 4, 2019),
https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/
060419-dc-circuit-upholds-us-ferc-orders-in-ghg-case-offers-misgivings-onnepa-effort [https://perma.cc/7Q37-TGTL].
153
See Dominion Transmission, Inc., Order Denying Rehearing, 163 FERC
¶ 61,128, ¶¶ 61,705–10 (2018).
154
See id. ¶¶ 61,705–06.
155
Id. ¶ 61,709.
151
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III. TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN RECENT
FERC CERTIFICATION DECISIONS
Pursuant to the broad authority conferred by section 7 of the
NGA, and as described in the 1999 Policy Statement, FERC
conducts both an economic and an environmental review of pipeline
projects. FERC claims to consider the findings of both reviews when
deciding whether a project is required by the public convenience and
necessity and thus should be approved under section 7 of the
NGA.156 To test that claim, the author surveyed all major pipeline
approvals issued by FERC from 2014 to 2018, reviewing both
FERC’s approval decision157 and relevant supporting documents,
including any EA or EIS prepared under NEPA.158 The review
indicates that FERC often bases its approval of pipeline projects
primarily, if not exclusively, on an assessment of economic impacts
and ignores environmental factors.159
A total of 125 major pipeline projects were approved by FERC
during the five years from 2014 to 2018.160 Each approval decision
followed a standard format, beginning with a description of the
relevant project, and then proceeding to determine whether it is
required by the public convenience and necessity. FERC bases that
determination on an assessment of economic factors and rarely
considers the environmental effects of pipeline development, unless

156

See Notice of Inquiry, Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Facilities,
83 Fed. Reg. 18,020 (Apr. 19, 2018).; see also supra Part I.
157
The author reviewed the original approval order issued by FERC for each
project. Subsequent FERC orders (e.g., on rehearing) were not reviewed.
158
The study focused on projects involving ground-disturbing activities.
Projects not involving ground disturbance were excluded from the study. The
study also excluded projects that were not approved under section 7 of the NGA
(e.g., because they were covered by the “blanket” certification regime established
in FERC’s regulations). Projects denied approval, either under section 7 or the
blanket certification regime, were also excluded from the study.
159
FERC has faced significant criticism regarding its economic assessment,
with environmentalists and others asserting that the Commission fails to
adequately consider the need for pipeline development and its likely impact on the
affected groups’ economic interests, as required by the 1999 Policy Statement. See
discussion supra notes 113, 116.
160
The 125 pipeline projects were approved in 114 decisions, with twelve of
those decisions covering two or more projects. However, all of the multi-project
decisions included separate sections outlining FERC’s reasons for approving each
project, and thus have been treated as separate decisions for the purposes of this
analysis.
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they have immediate economic consequences.161 A broader range of
environmental effects is discussed elsewhere in FERC’s decisions,
but that discussion invariably follows the economic assessment.162
At the conclusion of the economic assessment, and before any
review of environmental effects, FERC determines whether the
public convenience and necessity require approval of the project.
That is, FERC first concludes that the project should be approved,
and only then discusses its environmental effects.
In justifying its approval of pipeline projects, FERC typically
relies solely on the economic assessment and often makes no
mention of the environmental review, suggesting it has no or little
bearing on the Commission’s decisions. As shown in Table 1 below,
of the 125 decisions issued by FERC from 2014 to 2018, just ten
(eight percent) expressly stated that project approval was “based on”
both the economic assessment and the environmental review.163 A
further forty-six decisions (thirty-seven percent) stated that approval
was “based on” the economic assessment and “subject to” the
environmental review.164 Notably however, only five of those
decisions (eleven percent) discussed environmental issues in the
section outlining FERC’s reasons for approving the project (the
approval section) and, in each, the discussion was limited to one to
two sentences describing measures taken by the project developer

161

For example, in most recent certification decisions, FERC has considered
the amount of land likely to be disturbed by pipeline development and whether or
how such disturbance will affect local landowners’ economic interests, including
their property rights. See, e.g., Order Issuing Certificates and Granting
Abandonment, Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC et al., 160 FERC ¶ 61,022,
¶¶ 61,121–22 (2017). FERC only discussed other (non-economic) environmental
impacts as part of its “public interest” assessment in fourteen decisions. Generally,
however, the discussion was extremely limited. See, e.g., id. ¶ 61,122.
162
Each certification decision issued from 2014 to 2018 included a section
titled “Environmental Impact,” discussing the findings of the environmental
review conducted for the relevant project under NEPA. As discussed further
below, key climate change and other environmental impacts are often omitted
from the NEPA review, and thus also not addressed in the “Environmental Impact”
section of FERC’s certification decision. See infra Part IV.
163
See, e.g., Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. & Empire Pipeline, Inc., Order
Granting Abandonment and Issuing Certificates, 158 FERC ¶ 61,145, ¶ 61,920
(2017).
164
See, e.g., Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC, Order Issuing Certificate, 165
FERC ¶ 61,221 (2018); Spire STL Pipeline LLC, Order Issuing Certificates, 164
FERC ¶ 61,085, ¶ 61,496 (2018).
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to mitigate adverse environmental impacts.165 A similarly brief
description of mitigation measures also appeared in the approval
sections of nine other decisions (representing seven percent of all
decisions).166 There was no substantive discussion of the findings of
FERC’s environmental review in the approval section of any
decision. In fact, in almost half of all decisions (forty-eight percent),
the approval section did not even mention the environmental review.
It appears, then, that FERC frequently ignores environmental issues
when deciding whether a project is required by the public
convenience and necessity and thus should be approved under
section 7 of the NGA.

To the extent FERC does consider environmental impacts
when approving pipeline projects, it focuses on impacts addressed
in its NEPA analysis. FERC has taken a fairly narrow view of the
analysis required under NEPA, refusing to consider key climate
change impacts, including upstream and downstream greenhouse
gas emissions, except in limited circumstances.167 Table 2 below
165

See, e.g., Spire STL Pipeline LLC, Order Issuing Certificates, 164 FERC
¶ 61,085, 61,496 (2018).
166
None of the decisions expressly stated that FERC’s approval of the project
was “based on,” or “subject to,” the environmental review.
167
See supra Section II.B.
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shows the treatment of greenhouse gas emissions in EAs and EISs
issued with respect to pipeline projects approved by FERC between
2014 and 2018 (recent pipeline EAs/EISs).168 Approximately
eighty-four percent of the EAs/EISs fully quantified the direct
greenhouse gas emissions resulting from both construction and
operation of the project under review.169 A further twelve percent of
the EAs/EISs included a partial quantification, while the remainder
discussed emissions in qualitative terms. Notably, however, there
was often no discussion—either qualitative or quantitative—of
upstream and downstream emissions in the recent pipeline
EAs/EISs.
As shown in Table 2 below, just thirty recent pipeline
EAs/EISs, twenty-seven percent of the total, quantified downstream
emissions, while none quantified upstream emissions. All but one
of the EAs/EISs quantifying downstream emissions were finalized
in late-2017 or early-2018, after the ruling in Sierra Club but before
issuance of the May 2018 Order. Prior to this, from late-2016 to
mid-2017, upstream or downstream emissions were quantified in
several of FERC’s pipeline approval decisions.170 Nevertheless,
FERC maintained that it was not required to consider such
emissions and often emphasized the unreliability of its emissions
estimates—a point reiterated in the May 2018 Order. Notably, but
perhaps unsurprisingly, none of the pipeline approval decisions or
associated EAs/EISs issued after the May 2018 Order (and reviewed

168

While FERC approved 125 pipeline projects during that period, it issued
just 111 EAs/EISs, twelve of which covered two or more projects. See infra Table
2.
169
One EIS only quantified emissions from certain aspects of project operation.
See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, NOS. CP13-73-000 & CP13-74-000,
SIERRITA PIPELINE PROJECT: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 4–225
(2014), https://perma.cc/BZU3-ZJE9 (quantifying emissions due to pipeline leaks,
and noting that “minimal” emissions may also be “released by blowdown events
under routine operations or upset conditions,” but failing to quantify those
emissions).
170
Upstream and/or downstream emissions were quantified in ten decisions
during this period. See, e.g., Rover Pipeline LLC, Order Issuing Certificates, 158
FERC ¶ 61,109 (2017). Upstream emissions were also quantified in two decisions
issued after the ruling in Sierra Club. See Millennium Pipeline Co., Order Issuing
Certificate, 161 FERC ¶ 61,229, ¶¶ 62,305–06 (2017); NEXUS Gas Transmission,
LLC, Order Issuing Certificates and Granting Abandonment, 160 FERC ¶ 61,022,
¶ 61,145 (2017).
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for this study) quantified upstream or downstream emissions.171
Most did not even discuss upstream and downstream emissions in
quantitative terms. In fact, a quantitative discussion of such
emissions was only included in twenty percent of all recent pipeline
EAs/EISs.172

171

Downstream emissions were quantified by Commissioner La Fleur in her
concurring opinions in three of the approval decisions issued after the May 2018
Order. See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., Order Issuing Certificate, 165 FERC
¶ 61,221 (2018) (La Fleur, concurring); RH energytrans, LLC, Order Issuing
Certificates, 165 FERC ¶ 61,218 (2018) (La Fleur, concurring); Tex. E.
Transmission, LP, Order Issuing Certificate and Approving Abandonment, 168
FERC ¶ 61,100 (2018) (La Fleur, concurring).
172
In most cases, the discussion merely highlighted the benefits of switching
from coal or oil to natural gas, with FERC emphasizing that this could reduce
downstream greenhouse gas emissions.
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FERC has repeatedly acknowledged that the greenhouse gas
emissions associated with pipeline development “contribute
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incrementally to climate change.”173 However, FERC has
consistently refused to assess the significance of that contribution,
arguing that there is “no standard methodology to determine how a
[pipeline] project’s relatively small incremental contribution to
[greenhouse gases] would translate into physical effects on the
global environment.”174 FERC has also refused to monetize the
climate damages resulting from project-related emissions, for
example, using the social cost of carbon (SCC).175 The SCC reflects
the cost, expressed in dollars per ton, of current and future damage
caused by carbon dioxide emissions.176 It is widely considered the
best available estimate of the costs imposed by climate damage,177
having been developed by an interagency working group,
comprising experts from twelve federal bodies, based on the latest
scientific and economic modeling.178 Despite this, however, FERC

173

See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, NO. CP18-6-000, RH
ENERGYTRANS, LLC RISBERG LINE PROJECT: ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 115
(2018), https://perma.cc/B2R2-QTZX.
174
See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, NO. CP18-18-000
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE COMPANY, L.L.C. GATEWAY EXPANSION
PROJECT: ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 55 (2018), https://perma.cc/DRW7C29C. The author’s review found that FERC only made a determination with
respect to the significance of greenhouse gas emissions in six (5%) of the EAs or
EISs issued with respect to pipeline projects approved from 2014 to 2018.
175
See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, NO. CP17-458-000 FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR MIDSHIP PIPELINE COMPANY, LLC—
MIDCONTINENT SUPPLY HEADER INTERSTATE PIPELINE PROJECT, VOLUME I 4-192
(2018), https://perma.cc/4CAQ-LXAG.
176
See EPA, FACT SHEET: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 1 (2015),
http://bit.ly/2a9QhmW. The SCC was developed by the Interagency Working
Group on the Social Cost of Carbon, which was established by the Obama
administration in 2009 and included representatives from eleven federal agencies.
See generally INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOCIAL COST OF CARBON,
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF
CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866
(2013, rev. 2015), https://perma.cc/3NCG-6ZQT; Michael Greenstone et al.,
Developing a Social Cost of Carbon for U.S. Regulatory Analysis: A Methodology
and Interpretation, 7 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 23 (2013). In 2017, the Trump
administration disbanded the Interagency Working Group and withdrew its
estimate of the SCC “as no longer representative of governmental policy.” See
Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,095–96 (Mar. 31, 2017).
177
See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz et al., Best Cost Estimate of Greenhouse Gases,
375 SCIENCE 6352 (2017).
178
See generally INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP., supra note 176.
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has refused to use the SCC because (in its view) the “tool has
methodological limitations” that undermine its usefulness.179
Notwithstanding its refusal to assess significance, in several
recent pipeline EAs/EISs, FERC has baldly dismissed pipeline
projects’ climate impacts. Many of the EAs/EISs emphasized that
the direct greenhouse gas emissions associated with pipeline
development represent a trivial proportion of the national or global
greenhouse gas inventory.180 When discussing indirect emissions,
FERC often claims that such emissions would occur regardless of
pipeline development because natural gas will continue to be
produced and used, but transported in other ways.181 FERC also
frequently claims that pipeline development will lead to the
substitution of natural gas for coal and thus reduce total
emissions.182 Little evidence is, however, provided to support those
claims. Indeed, none of the recent pipeline EAs/EISs issued by
FERC included a detailed assessment of likely changes in the use of
natural gas, coal, and/or other energy sources.
FERC also often fails to consider pipelines projects’
vulnerability to the effects of climate change. Just over half (fiftyone percent) of recent pipeline EAs/EISs discussed the likely effects
of climate change on the project area and, of those, only seven (six
percent of the total) analyzed how those effects would impact the
project or identified measures to mitigate any adverse impacts (see
Table 3 below).

179

FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 175, at 4–192.
See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, NO. CP14-529-000
TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY, L.L.C. CONNECTICUT EXPANSION PROJECT:
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 119 (2015), https://perma.cc/YEH8-7489
(asserting that greenhouse gas “emissions from the construction and operation of
the proposed Project would be negligible compared to the global [greenhouse gas]
emission inventory”).
181
See, e.g., Dominion Transmission, Inc., Order Denying Rehearing, 163
FERC ¶ 61,128, ¶ 61,695 (2018) (claiming that upstream and downstream
greenhouse gas emissions “will likely occur regardless of the Commission’s
approval of the . . . Project”).
182
See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 180, at 119
(stating that “burning natural gas results in less [carbon dioxide-equivalent]
compared to other fuel sources (e.g., fuel oil or coal)”).
180
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IV. INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS INTO
FERC’S CERTIFICATION PROCESS
As the foregoing discussion shows, while FERC claims to
consider both economic and environmental impacts when certifying
interstate natural gas pipelines, it frequently justifies its certification
decisions solely on economic grounds. It appears, then, that
environmental factors are often given little or no weight in FERC’s
certification decisions. Even where they are taken into account in
decisionmaking, FERC typically ignores key climate change
impacts associated with pipeline development, including upstream
and downstream greenhouse gas emissions. This has prompted
criticism from some scholars (including this author), who assert that
FERC should evaluate upstream and downstream emissions as part
of its certification process because doing so would provide valuable
information about the climate impacts of pipeline development,
leading to improved decisionmaking.183 This Article goes further,
arguing that consideration of upstream and downstream emissions
183

See, e.g., WEISSMAN & WEBB, supra note 25, at 46 (asserting that
consideration of upstream and downstream emissions would “increase awareness
of natural gas’ potential climate impacts” and thus “encourage more climatesensitive decision-making”); HEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 5 (asserting that, by
considering upstream and downstream emissions, FERC can “limit legal risk . . .
while better informing policymakers and the public about the environmental
effects of proposed projects”).
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is not only good policy, but a legal requirement under section 7 of
the NGA.
Under section 7 of the NGA, before certifying any pipeline
project, FERC must find that it “is or will be required by the public
convenience and necessity.” The courts have repeatedly held that,
when making its finding, FERC may consider the environmental
impacts of pipeline development, including upstream and
downstream impacts. There is, however, limited case law
addressing whether FERC must do so.184 The case law that does
exist indicates that such impacts are central to FERC’s
determination of whether pipeline development is required by the
public convenience and necessity. That view is supported by the
language and history of section 7 of the NGA, as well as FERC’s
own orders interpreting and applying the section. Thus, FERC
arguably cannot fulfill its statutory obligation under section 7 of the
NGA unless it considers the full climate change and other
environmental impacts of pipeline development, including upstream
and downstream impacts.
A. Requirement to Assess Environmental Impacts
For over a century, the public convenience and necessity
standard has been used in various federal and state statutes
governing the certification of public services.185 The courts have
consistently interpreted those statutes as requiring certifying
agencies to determine whether provision of the relevant service is in
the public interest based on a comprehensive assessment of its
benefits and costs.186 Thus, in the context of the NGA, the Supreme
184

See generally Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 900
F.2d 269, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (indicating that it is “entirely plausible” that
Congress intended the former FPC (now FERC) to consider “environmental and
conservation factors” but failing to rule on whether such consideration is required);
Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
762 F.3d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (observing that FERC’s 1999 Policy Statement
indicates that it “will” consider environmental impacts); Meyersville Citizens for
a Rural Cmty. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 783 F.3d 1301, 1309 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (noting that FERC’s 1999 Policy Statement listed “advancing clean air
objectives” as a potential benefit of pipeline development that FERC may consider
when approving projects); Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867
F.3d 1357, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (indicating that FERC “could deny a . . .
certificate on the grounds that the pipeline would be too harmful to the
environment”). Cf. HEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 9.
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Court has held that FERC must “evaluate all factors bearing on the
public interest” when making certification decisions.187 Of course,
in NAACP, the Supreme Court emphasized that FERC’s decision
cannot take into account every factor affecting the general public
welfare.188 However, it must be based on a review of all factors
relevant to achieving the purposes of the NGA, which the Supreme
Court described as “encourag[ing] the orderly development of
plentiful supplies of natural gas at reasonable prices,” while also
taking into account “conservation, environmental, and antitrust”
issues.189
The courts have repeatedly upheld FERC’s authority to
consider the environmental impacts of pipeline development,
including upstream and downstream impacts, when certifying
projects under section 7 of the NGA. Most notably, in
Transcontinental, the Supreme Court identified the air quality
impacts of downstream natural gas use as a relevant factor to be
taken into account in certification decisions.190 More recently, in
Sierra Club, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed
that “FERC could deny a pipeline certificate on the ground that the
pipeline would be too harmful to the environment” due to its
downstream impacts.191 As discussed in Section II.B above, the
court in Sierra Club held that FERC violated NEPA by failing to
adequately consider the environmental impacts of the Southeast
Market Pipelines Project, including downstream greenhouse gas
emissions.192 The court’s decision rested on a finding that, under the
NGA, FERC had “statutory authority to act” on information
187
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See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp, 365 U.S. 1, 8
(1961) (declaring that the potential for improved air quality due to the substitution
of natural gas for coal “was entitled to [be given] great weight” by the then FPC).
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regarding downstream emissions when deciding whether to certify
the project. That finding was affirmed in Birckhead, with the D.C.
Circuit again holding that FERC’s certification decision may take
into account environmental factors, including downstream
emissions.193
While the above decisions clearly establish that FERC is
authorized to consider environmental impacts in its certification
decisions, they do not address whether it is required to do so. The
case law does, however, establish such a requirement with respect
to the other subsidiary issues identified in NAACP. In Pittsburgh v.
FPC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the
former FPC (now FERC) must consider any potential
anti-competitive effects of pipeline development when issuing
certificates under section 7 of the NGA.194 The D.C. Circuit
reasoned that federal antitrust laws evince a national policy in favor
of competition which can be advanced through FPC regulation
under the NGA.195 Indeed, as was recognized in NAACP, avoiding
anticompetitive outcomes is a subsidiary purpose of the NGA.196
Thus, the D.C. Circuit held that anticompetitive issues are directly
related to the FPC’s exercise of regulatory authority under the NGA,
and must be taken into account in its decisions.197
Environmental issues have a similarly direct bearing on
regulation under the NGA. The courts have recognized that other
federal statutes—most notably NEPA—establish a clear federal
policy in favor of protecting the environment, which FERC plays a
role in effectuating through its exercise of regulatory authority under
the NGA.198 In this regard, the courts have emphasized that FERC
regulates activities, including pipeline development, which
“necessarily and typically have dramatic natural resource
impacts.”199 Again, under the NGA, a key purpose of regulation is
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to avoid adverse environmental outcomes.200 Given this, and
applying the reasoning in Pittsburgh v. FPC, there is a strong
argument that FERC is legally required to consider environmental
impacts when determining whether to issue a certificate of public
convenience and necessity under section 7 of the NGA.
B. Scope of the Required Environmental Assessment
Seemingly accepting the requirement to consider
environmental issues when certifying interstate natural gas
pipelines, in its 1999 Policy Statement, FERC described its role
under section 7 of the NGA as being to “balance demonstrated
market demand against potential adverse environmental
impacts.”201 In recent certification decisions, issued between 2014
and 2018, FERC has focused on direct environmental impacts that
have immediate economic consequences, such as land
disturbance.202 For example, one recent decision noted that pipeline
construction would disturb agricultural land by preventing its use
for one growing season and thus impose financial losses on the
landowner.203 However, the decision did not explore the economic
consequences of other direct environmental impacts, such as
construction-related
greenhouse
gas
emissions.
Those
consequences have been entirely ignored by FERC in recent
certification decisions.204
Research shows that greenhouse gas emissions and associated
climate change impose significant economic costs, including on the
agricultural sector, with rising temperatures causing a significant
decline in crop yields.205 FERC often seeks to justify its refusal to
200
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consider such impacts by asserting that the emissions associated
with individual pipeline projects represent a trivial proportion of
global or national totals. That does not, however, mean that
individual projects have no impact. On the contrary, given the
already high concentration of greenhouse gases in the earth’s
atmosphere, any addition—regardless of size—will cause
significant damage and impose significant costs.206 There is no
rational basis for distinguishing between those impacts and others
routinely considered by FERC. While the impacts of greenhouse gas
emissions may be felt over longer periods, that does not prevent
their consideration under section 7, which expressly requires
assessment of the “future” public convenience and necessity.207 The
courts have emphasized the need to assess the convenience and
necessity of the public as a whole, so the fact that emissions impacts
may be widespread does not excuse FERC from considering
them.208 Nor does the fact that precise impacts may be somewhat
speculative,209 since the courts have long recognized that the public
convenience and necessity assessment will often involve a degree
of “prophecy,” but that “uncertainties need [not] paralyze the
Commission into inaction.”210 FERC is also not prevented from
acting merely because other agencies (e.g., EPA) exercise
regulatory control over emissions. In this regard, the courts have
recognized that FERC’s assessment will often encompass issues for
206
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which “other agencies are more directly responsible and more
competent,” but that does not prevent their consideration by the
Commission.211 While FERC may have limited expertise with
respect to climate impacts, it may make use of various tools and
datasets developed by other agencies, including the SCC metric.212
FERC cannot, therefore, avoid its obligation to assess climate
impacts by pointing to a lack of information. Given the above, and
to ensure a balanced assessment of pipeline projects, FERC must
consider the economic impacts of project-related greenhouse gas
emissions. However, as explained in Section IV.A, FERC cannot
base its assessment solely on economic impacts. Thus, FERC must
do more than merely consider direct, economically significant
environmental effects. As we shall see below, FERC historically
considered a much broader range of environmental effects as part of
the section 7 assessment, but has recently sought to constrain the
scope of its review. Specifically, in the May 2018 Order, FERC
indicated that it would only consider those environmental impacts
required to be analyzed under NEPA.213 FERC has therefore refused
to consider upstream and downstream greenhouse gas emissions,
which it views as falling beyond the scope of its NEPA analysis
(except in limited circumstances).214 This is not only inconsistent
with FERC’s treatment of other upstream and downstream impacts
in NGA decisions, but also contrary to decades of case law
interpreting the public convenience and necessity standard.
Both the history of the public convenience and necessity
standard, as well as the case law interpreting it, suggest that section
7 of the NGA imposes an independent obligation to consider
211
Pittsburgh, 237 F.2d at 754–55 (holding that FERC may consider issues
relating to national defense, despite the fact that they fall within the competence
of other agencies, and stating that “[t]he Commission would . . . do well to respect
the views of such other agencies as to those” issues); see also Glick &
Christiansen, supra note 25, at 43 (“Agencies throughout the federal government
regulatory consider climate change in their decision-making process . . . even
though those agencies cannot establish a federal climate policy.”).
212
See HEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 37–38. For a discussion of other available
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See Dominion Transmission, Inc., Order Denying Rehearing, 163 FERC ¶
61,128, ¶ 61,695 (2018) (stating that FERC is “not aware of any basis that
indicates the Commission is required to consider environmental effects that are
outside of our NEPA analysis . . . in our determination of whether a project is in
the public convenience and necessity under section 7”).
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environmental impacts, which is not constrained by NEPA. As
discussed in Part II.C above, pre-NGA statutes incorporating the
public convenience and necessity standard were universally
interpreted as requiring a broad-ranging public interest assessment,
taking into account environmental and other social costs.215 That
interpretation was known to, and implicitly approved by, Congress
when it enacted section 7 of the NGA.216 In its early decisions under
section 7, FERC’s predecessor—the FPC—recognized the need to
consider various “public interest factors not specifically mentioned”
in the NGA, including the “effect of pipeline location on areas
traversed.”217 In this regard, the FPC emphasized that “[t]he
construction of natural gas [pipeline] facilities can affect scenic,
historic, and recreational values, which are factors to be considered
. . . by the Commission in determining whether facilities proposed
to be constructed are required by the public convenience and
necessity.”218
The FPC did not limit its review to the localized environmental
impacts of pipeline development, but also considered upstream and
downstream effects, which it viewed as directly relevant to its public
convenience and necessity assessment.219 Congress clearly agreed,
as evidenced by the fact that, in 1942, it amended section 7 of the
NGA to enable greater consideration of downstream effects.220 The
Supreme Court weighed in on the amendment in 1944 in FPC v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., wherein Justice Jackson opined that the
NGA “require[s the FPC] to take account of the ultimate use of the
[natural] gas.”221 Consistent with this view, in subsequent decisions,
the FPC—and later FERC—emphasized the need to consider
downstream environmental impacts associated with natural gas
use.222
215
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FPC decisions issued in the 1950s and 1960s routinely
discussed how natural gas transported via a proposed pipeline
project would be used and assessed the air quality impacts of that
use.223 In a key decision in 1966, the FPC refused to certify a
pipeline intended to deliver natural gas to electric generators in Los
Angeles, in part because there was insufficient evidence that
switching from oil- to gas-fired generation would improve local air
quality.224 The FPC held that the air quality impact of natural gas
use is “one of the most important factors” to be considered under
section 7 of the NGA.225 The FPC expressly rejected claims that
environmental statutes enacted after the NGA make other entities
solely responsible for addressing air pollution or “deprive [it] of its
statutory authority and responsibility [under the NGA] to make an
independent determination” as to whether increased natural gas use
would help “to combat air pollution.”226
There is nothing to suggest that the FPC viewed the effect of
NEPA as somehow different from that of other environmental
statutes. On the contrary, following the enactment of NEPA, the
FPC continued to consider downstream air quality impacts when
assessing the public convenience and necessity under section 7 of
the NGA.227 The FPC focused on conventional air pollutants that
have localized impacts, such as sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide,
but greenhouse gases are equally relevant to the section 7
assessment. Like sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide, greenhouse
gases have been classified as “air pollutants” under the federal Clean
Commission will continue to take into account as a factor for its consideration the
overall benefits to the environment of natural gas consumption.”).
223
See, e.g., Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 21 FPC 138 (1959) (order denying
certificate of public convenience and necessity); Transwestern Pipeline Co., 36
FPC 176 (1966) (order granting and denying certificates).
224
See Transwestern Pipeline Co., 36 FPC at 190 (“[W]e cannot conclude on
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because of the effects of such certification upon the air pollution situation.”).
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Air Act, with the Environmental Protection Agency finding that
they “endanger public health and welfare.”228 Again, while the
impacts of greenhouse gas emissions may be less localized and
immediate, that does not prevent their consideration under section
7. Nor does the fact that precise impacts are difficult to predict with
certainty.
CONCLUSION
Under section 7 of the NGA, when approving the construction
or expansion of interstate natural gas pipelines, FERC must ensure
that pipeline development “is or will be required by the present or
future public convenience and necessity.”229 This has been held to
require a broad-ranging review, in which FERC must “evaluate all
factors bearing on the public interest” to determine whether pipeline
development would further the NGA’s objectives of ensuring
plentiful natural gas supplies, while avoiding conservation,
environmental, and antitrust issues.230 To make that determination,
FERC considers the need for pipeline development, its benefits, and
costs. FERC undertakes two separate reviews, one of which focuses
on the economic impacts of development, and the other on its
environmental consequences. However, FERC’s environmental
review often ignores key climate change impacts associated with
pipeline development, including the potential for upstream and
downstream greenhouse gas emissions.231 Even where those
impacts are reviewed, they appear to have little bearing on FERC’s
decision to approve pipeline development, which is typically
justified solely on economic grounds.232
Debate is currently raging—both among scholars and in the
courts—over the extent to which the climate impacts of pipeline
development must be considered under NEPA. The D.C. Circuit
recently weighed in, ruling in Sierra Club that NEPA requires
consideration of downstream greenhouse gas emissions, at least in
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some circumstances.233 The courts have not addressed whether the
NGA imposes a separate requirement to consider upstream or
downstream emissions. However, the language and history of the
NGA, the case law interpreting it, and FERC’s own statements
regarding its implementation, support the existence of such a
requirement. Indeed, FERC cannot fulfil its statutory obligation
under the NGA to ensure pipeline development is required by the
public convenience and necessity without considering upstream and
downstream emissions. FERC must, therefore, change its approach
to evaluating pipeline projects. Going forward, before approving
any project, FERC must be satisfied that its economic benefits
outweigh its potential climate change and other environmental
impacts.
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